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Abstract
The economic analysis of global warming is dominated by models based on optimal
growth theory. This approach can generate biases in the presence of positional goods
and status effects. We show that by ignoring these direct consumption externalities,
integrated assessment models overestimate the social return to conventional investment
and underestimate the optimal amount of investment in mitigation. Empirical evidence
on the influence of relative consumption on utility suggests that the bias could be
quantitatively significant. Our results from a simple survey support this conclusion.
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1 Introduction
Climate change affects countries differently, and within regions the impact varies across
groups. The time dimension introduces other distributional elements: the costs of global
warming are born (mainly) by future generations while the investment in mitigation may
impose costs on the current generation.
The uneven distribution of costs and benefits is not unique to climate change and envi-
ronmental policy. Policy generally benefits some people while others are hurt, and Pareto
rankings of the outcomes are typically not available. Instead, decisions have to be based
on social welfare evaluations that make (implicit or explicit) interpersonal comparisons,
weighing up costs and benefits so as to arrive at a net result. The standard approach
in the economic literature on climate change has been to use the utility function of ‘the
representative agent’ as a social welfare function.
The approach is in line with trends within macroeconomics where models based on
an optimizing representative agent are ubiquitous. The models are seen as ‘micro-founded’,
even though well-behaved preferences at the agent level fail to imply that aggregate outcomes
behave as if they were generated by an optimizing representative agent, a result that has
been well-known since the work of Debreu (1974), Mantel (1976) and Sonnenschein (1972).
Abstracting from these existence problems, the preferences of the representative agent may
seem to provide the appropriate way to measure social welfare. The analysis can lead to
systematic biases, however. In this paper we focus on the intertemporal dimension and the
biases that arise when consumption has a positional component. To simplify the analysis and
highlight these particular effects, we disregard problems associated with intra-generational
distribution and assume that all agents are identical with respect to both preferences and
endowments; Skott and Davis (2011) examine biases that derive from intra-generational
inequality.
The paper is in five sections. Section 2 considers representative agents and the role of
the rates of return. Section 3 introduces positional goods and sets up a small model to
analyze how they affect the optimal amount of investment in mitigation. Section 4 relates
the formal model to procedures used in climate models to evaluate the costs and benefits
of mitigation, and presents the results of a small survey to evaluate the importance of the
biases identified by the model. Section 5 summarizes the results and offers a few concluding
remarks.
2 Representative agents and rates of return
Consider a market economy and assume that the trajectories of aggregate consumption,
investment and output can be described as if determined by an intertemporally optimizing
representative agent. Given this highly restrictive assumption, it may seem reasonable to
use the utility function of the representative agent as the social welfare function. Woodford
(2003 p. 12; emphasis added), for instance, suggests that the utility function of the repre-
sentative agent "provides a natural objective in terms of which alternative policies should
be evaluated", while, according to Blanchard (2008, p. 9, emphasis added), contempo-
rary macro models with formal optimization enable one "to derive optimal policy based on
the correct (within the model) welfare criterion". Most tellingly, perhaps, the evaluation
of outcomes based on the stipulated utility function of the representative agent is usually
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presented without any argument or caveat.1
Using this ‘descriptive’ representative-agent approach, the social welfare function has to
be calibrated to fit empirical observations.2 An optimizing representative agent in a standard
discounted-utility model chooses a consumption path that satisfies the Euler equation
cˆ =
1
θ
(r − ρ) (1)
where c is consumption and a hat over a variable denotes a growth rate (cˆ = dcdt/c); ρ is the
pure rate of time preference, θ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and r the real rate
of return on saving. We have observations for r and cˆ, and the choices of the representative
agent should match these observations. It follows that although the social welfare function
has two parameters, θ and ρ, there is only one degree of freedom.
Most economic analyses of climate change have followed the descriptive approach. The
Stern Review (Stern 2007) is an exception. Stern adopted a ‘prescriptive’ approach to social
welfare and argued that on ethical grounds the pure discount rate should be close to zero. He
combined the low discount rate with a logarithmic specification of the instantaneous utility
function (θ = 1), and this combination of parameters fuels the strong recommendations of
the Stern Review.
Not surprisingly, Stern’s assumptions have been challenged. Nordhaus (2008) rejects
Stern’s "lofty vantage point of the social planner" as being "misleading in the context of
global warming and particularly as it informs the negotiations of policies among sovereign
states" (p. 174). Advocating a descriptive approach, Nordhaus wants to base the analysis
on the revealed preferences of the representative agent. This approach, he argues, does
not assume "the social desirability of the distribution of incomes over space or time under
existing conditions". Instead,
The calculations of changes in world welfare arising from efficient climate-change
policies examine potential improvements within the context of the existing dis-
tribution of income and investments across space and time. (Nordhaus, 2008, p.
174-175)
There is an internal tension in Nordhaus’s defense of the descriptive approach. He also
argues that
The individual rates of time preference, risk preference, and utility functions do
not, in principle at least, enter into the discussion or arguments at all. An indi-
vidual may have high time preference, or perhaps double hyperbolic discounting,
or negative discounting, but this has no necessary connection with how social de-
cisions weight different generations. Similar cautions apply to the consumption
elasticity. (p. 172)
It seems inconsistent, however, to argue that there is "no necessary connection" between
individual choice and the appropriate criteria for social decisions and, at the same time, insist
1Nordhaus (2008, p. 39) simply comments that
policies are chosen to maximize a social welfare function that is the discounted sum of the
population-weighted utility of per capita consumption. Equation (A.1) is the mathematical
statement of the objective function. This representation is a standard one in modern theories
of optimal economic growth.
2The ‘prescriptive’/‘descriptive’ terminology is used by Arrow at al. (IPCC chapter 4, 1996).
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on a descriptive representative-agent approach to social valuation. The rationale behind the
descriptive approach is precisely that the representative agent describes the average behavior
of the individuals; why insist on the descriptive approach if individual choices are irrelevant?
Leaving aside this inconsistency, Stern’s combination of a logarithmic utility function
and a near-zero discount rate fails to meet the descriptive test if the annual real rate of
return is taken to fall in a range that matches the observed return on private capital.3 More
importantly, whatever one may think about ethics and the pure rate of discount, there is a
tradeoff, Nordhaus argues, between investment in mitigation and investment in other areas
including traditional capital, R&D, education etc. If r measures the social rate of return to
these conventional investment projects, investment in emissions reduction must get a similar
return:
In choosing among alternative trajectories for emissions reductions, the key eco-
nomic variable is the real return on capital, r, which measures the net yield on
investments in capital, education, and technology. In principle, this is observable
in the marketplace. ... The return on capital is the discount rate that enters
into the determination of the efficient balance between the cost of emissions re-
ductions today and the benefit of reduced climate damages in the future. A high
return on capital tilts the balance toward emissions reductions in the future,
while a low return tilts reductions toward the present. (Nordhaus 2008, p. 59)
According to Nordhaus, the Stern Review with its low discount rate for investment in
abatement would misallocate investment to such an extent that an attempt to maintain
the welfare of current generations "would leave the future absolutely worse off; it would be
Pareto-deteriorating. The Stern Review’s approach is inefficient because it invests too much
in low-yield abatement strategies too early" (p. 180). Looking at this from another angle,
the Stern parameters have implications for the optimal levels of conventional investment.
Using these parameters and the observed values of the return to capital, the optimal global
saving rate would be about twice the current level, an implication that does not, Nordhaus
suggests, seem "ethically compelling" when global per capita consumption is expected to
grow from around $6,600 today to around $87,000 in two centuries measured in constant
2005 dollars (Nordhaus 2008, p.179).
This general argument has considerable appeal.4 But it relies on the implicit assumption
that socially optimal trajectories require an expected rate of return to mitigation that is
(approximately) equal to the observed private rate of return on capital. This assumption
may be invalid. As pointed out by Weitzman (2007, 2009), the returns to mitigation may be
high in bad states of the world, and this can dramatically reduce the appropriate discount
rate for investment in abatement. Michl (2010) also comments on the use of the rate of
return on private capital as the basis for discounting mitigation. He notes in particular the
implications of the capital controversy for the identification of the rate of return on capital
with a ‘marginal product of capital’. Like these contributions, our argument in this paper
focuses on the appropriate discount rate for investment in mitigation and, like Weitzman,
we argue that it is much lower than the private real rate of return. But the mechanism is
3This is the range used by Nordhaus (2008); see e.g. p. 57.
4It appears to be in line with Rezai et al. (2011). The pure discount rate and the tradeoff between
current and future generations are not nearly as important as is commonly believed, they argue. The real
question is whether the composition of investment should be changed, and starting from a business-as-usual
case in which all investment is guided by private profit, the answer is yes: addressing the climate externality
can lead to Pareto improvements if some investment is re-directed from conventional areas to mitigation.
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different.5
Environmental externalities are not the only externalities. Utility derives not just, or
even primarily, from absolute consumption, once a certain level has been reached. The
level of consumption relative to other people and relative to own past consumption may
be at least as important. A substantial literature has emphasized these effects,6 and the
argument has empirical support. Recent empirical studies have shown a high correlation
between relative income and reported well-being; prominent examples include Blanchflower
and Oswald (2004) who examine data for the US and UK, Luttmer (2005) with US data, and
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) with data for Nepal. The use in these studies of reported ‘well-
being’ or ‘happiness’ as a measure of utility raises many issues, but it would be hard to reject
the influence of relative income and status on utility, and ‘happiness’ studies are not the only
source of empirical support.7 Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) analyze experimental choices
between hypothetical societies and find a strong concern for relative income. Evidence from
the experimental and behavioral literature also suggest that ‘social preferences’ shape the
behavior of many people (Fehr and Schmidt 2003).
The relevance of status and relative income effects for economic policy has been examined
by among others Ng and Wang (1995) and Howarth (2000), but to our knowledge there has
been no attempts to analyze the implications for climate change and the appropriate discount
rate for investment in abatement.
3 A model
Consider a simple two-period model. There are two goods, a standard good and an environ-
mental good. The standard good (y) is a private good, but the consumption of this good
involves a positional element and increased consumption imposes a negative externality on
other agents. We disregard the uneven distribution of the effects of climate change and treat
the environmental good as a pure public good.
All agents are identical, and the preferences of an agent can be described by the following
utility function
U = u(ck0 , c0, x0) +
1
1 + ρ
u(ck1 , c1, x1) : u1 > 0, u2 < 0, u3 > 0 (2)
where u(., ., .) is the per-period utility function; c is the consumption of the standard good
and x the environmental good; superscripts k indicate agent and subscripts on a variable (0
or 1) indicate period; c−variables without a superscript refer to average consumption across
5The discount rate is not the only variable that matters for optimal mitigation. The specification of
the damage function can produce dramatic effects on optimal mitigation. Thus, Rezai et al. (2011) use
a version in which the proportional effect on output of an increase in atmospheric CO2 goes to infinity
as the CO2 concentration approaches a a finite level (which is set at just over twice the current level in
their simulations). This assumption, which is quite different from the specifications in DICE (the Dynamic
Integrated model of Climate and the Economy developed by Nordhaus), contributes to the contrast between
their findings and those of Nordhaus. As pointed out by Weitzman (2009, p. 16) the damages at high CO2
concentrations are typically found by extrapolation using a functional form that is largely arbitrary, and
there is little justification for the standard versions.
Ackerman et al. (2010) modify the standard Nordhaus-type assumptions in another direction by respeci-
fying the costs of abatement, using estimates from a study by McKinsey & Co.
6The contributions include Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), Sen (1983), Easterlin (1974, 2001), Frank
(1985, 2005) and Hirsch (1977).
7Frey and Stutzer (2002) survey the behavioral literature on ‘happiness’.
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all agents; by definition the consumption of the public environmental good x is uniform
across agents.
The standard good can be used for either consumption, conventional investment (i) or
investment in abatement (m), and we assume
ck1 = F (i
k
0); F
￿ > 0 (3)
x1 = G(i0,m0); G1 < 0, G2 > 0 (4)
yk0 = c
k
0 + i
k
0 +m
k
0 (5)
ck0 ≥ 0, ik0 ≥ 0,mk0 ≥ 0 (6)
Note that agent k’s consumption of the standard good in period 1 depends on the agent’s
own investment while the consumption of the environmental good is determined by aggre-
gate conventional and abatement investment. The amounts y0 and x0 of the standard and
environmental good that are available in period 0 are taken as exogenous, and all agents
have the same initial endowment of the standard good (yk0 = y0).
We now consider 4 different scenarios:
A: Business as usual
Without policy intervention, agents maximize (2) subject to (3)-(6). It is readily seen
that the solution has mk0 = 0 and that it satisfies a standard Euler equation
u1(c
k
0 , c0, x0) = u1(c
k
1 , c1, x1)
F ￿(ik0)
1 + ρ
(7)
where subscripts on a function indicate partial derivatives (e.g.u1 = ∂u(ck0 , c0, x0)/∂ck0). In
equilibrium, ckj = cj and ik0 = i0, and we have
u1(c0, c0, x0) = u1(c1, c1, x1)
F ￿(i0)
1 + ρ
(8)
B: Addressing the environmental externality
A benevolent social planner should take into account both the environmental externalities
(equation (4)) and the positional-good externality (u2 ≤ 0). But consider first the case in
which the social planner overlooks the positional-good externality; that is, she mistakenly
believes that u2 = 0.
Social welfare is given by
U = u(c0, c0, x0) +
1
1 + ρ
u(c1, c1, x1) : u1 > 0, u2 ≤ 0, u3 > 0 (9)
Maximizing (9) subject to (3)-(6) and the symmetry condition (ckj = cj , ikj = ij ,mkj = mj),
and setting u2 = 0, we get the following first-order conditions:
u1(c0, c0, x0) =
u1(c1, c1, x1)F ￿(i0) + u3(c1, c1, x1)G1(i0,m0)
1 + ρ
(10)
u1(c0, c0, x0) =
u3(c1, c1, x1)G2(i0,m0)
1 + ρ
(11)
5
C: Addressing the positional-good externality
In this case, the social planner overlooks the environmental externality. Equation (4) is
ignored and the values of both x0 and x1 are treated as exogenous. The planner therefore
sets m0 = 0 and chooses i0, c0 to maximize (9) subject to (3), (5)-(6) and the symmetry
condition.
The first-order condition in this case becomes
u1(c0, c0, x0) + u2(c0, c0, x0) = [u1(c1, c1, x1) + u2(c1, c1, x1)]
F ￿(ik0)
1 + ρ
(12)
D: Addressing both environmental and positional-good externalities
The first order conditions now take the following form:
u1(c0, c0, x0) + u2(c0, c0, x0) =
[u1(c1, c1, x1) + u2(c1, c1, x1)]F ￿(i0)
1 + ρ
+
u3(c1, c1, x1)G1(i0,m0)
1 + ρ
(13)
u1(c0, c0, x0) + u2(c0, c0, x0) =
u3(c1, c1, x1)G2(i0,m0)
1 + ρ
(14)
Comparing scenarios A and B, the climate externality tends to reduce the optimal amount
of conventional investment (use equations (9) and (10) and note the negative impact of i0
on x1 via G1 in the numerator on the right hand side of (10)), and equation (11) implies
positive amounts of investment in mitigation if u3G2 is sufficiently high at m0 = 0. These
are standard results.
The positional-good externality in scenario C may influence the optimal rate of invest-
ment, but in benchmark cases – including when u is CES – the optimal solution is identical
to the one in the A scenario.8 The intuition behind this seemingly paradoxical result is that
although the benefits from future increases in consumption are reduced by the externalities,
so are the costs from the required reduction in consumption, and these cost and benefit
effects offset each other.
Comparing cases B and D, however, it is apparent that the consumption externalities
become important for optimal investment when environmental externalities are present too.
Formally, this can be seen by noting that there are the same coefficients on G1 in the numer-
ator on the RHS of (10) and (13). Intuitively, the consumption externalities do not reduce
the negative impact of current investment on future consumption of the environmental good
and this reduces the optimal value of i0. The optimal investment in mitigation, on the other
hand, is boosted by the reduction in the social cost of a reduction in the period-0 consump-
tion of the standard good (equations (11) and (14) have the same RHS but the LHS has
been reduced in (14)).
A special case
8The conditions (8) and (12) are equivalent if there is a constant λ such that
u2(c, c, x) = λu1(c, c, x)
for all c, x. This condition is met for the CES specification of u,
u = [α1(c
k)δ − α2cδ + βxδ ]1/δ
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Consider a special case in which the standard and environmental goods are perfect substi-
tutes. Thus, let
u(ck, c, x) = v(z) (15)
where
z = ck − γc+ x (16)
is the amount of ‘generalized consumption’ and where it is assumed that v takes the standard
CIES form.9
Using these specifications the first-order conditions – taking into account both consump-
tion and environmental externalities – can be written
v￿(z0)(1− γ) = v
￿(z1)
1 + ρ
((1− γ)F ￿ +G1) (17)
v￿(z0)(1− γ) = v
￿(z1)
1 + ρ
G2 (18)
Hence, optimality requires that
G2 = (1− γ)F ￿ +G1 (19)
Equation (19) states the required equality between the social rates of return to the two
types of investment. G2 = ∂z1/∂m0 is the return to investment in mitigation. The gross
private return to conventional investment is given by ∂zk1/∂ik0 = F ￿; including the environ-
mental externality the social return is reduced to F ￿ + G1, and consumption externalities
introduce an additional wedge: the social benefits of a increase in the consumption of the
standard good is reduced by the factor 1− γ.
Any mapping of this stylized two period model into real-world decision problems raises
problems, but equation (19) can be used to derive a quick back-of-the-envelope estimate
of the magnitude of the positional-good effect. Thus, consider a period length of 50 years,
let the annual private return to conventional investment be 6 percent, and assume that
this return is reduced to 5 percent when the environmental externality is included (i.e.
F ￿ = exp(rT ) = exp(0.06 × 50), F ￿ + G1 = exp(0.05 × 50)). If γ = 0.5, equation (19)
implies that the required annual return to environmental investment is 1.5 percent,10 a
value that is virtually identical to the one used by the Stern Review.11
The special case has wider relevance. Consider a more general specification of ‘general-
ized’ consumption. Formally, let
u(ck, c, x) = v(z) (20)
z = H(ck, c, x) (21)
In terms of generalized consumption goods, the private return to conventional investment
now is given by H1F ￿; taking into account the environmental externality, the return in terms
of generalized consumption goods is H1F ￿+H3G1, and when both externalities are included
9The unit coefficient on ci and x can be obtained by an appropriate choice of units. Thus, there is no
loss of generality in using (16) rather than z = αci − γc+ βx.
10Solve the equation
exp(rm × 50) = (1− γ)F ￿ +G1
11Stern’s benchmark assumptions are ρ = 0.1%, θ = 1 and cˆ = 1.3%, with an implied r-value of 1.4.
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the return falls to (H1 +H2)F ￿ +H3G1. Optimality requires that this expression equal the
return to investment in abatement which, in terms of the generalized good, is now H3G2.12
Formally, using (13)-(14) and (20)-(21), the first-order conditions imply
H3G2 = [H1 +H2]F
￿ +H3G1 (22)
This optimality condition can be rewritten
H3G2 = [1 +
H2
H1
]H1F
￿ +H3G1 (23)
Equation (23) differs from (19) in two ways. The expressions for the returns in terms of
generalized consumption, first, are slightly more complicated (H3G1, H3G2, H1F ￿ instead
of G1, G2,F ￿); this difference is of no significance. The ratio −H2/H1, secondly, takes the
place of the constant γ. In equilibrium, however, we have ck = c and the ratio will be
constant if H takes a standard CES form: if H(ck, c, x) = [α1(ck)δ−α2cδ+βxδ]1/δ we have
−H2/H1 = α2(c
k)δ−1
α1cδ−1
=
α2
α1
= γ (24)
The benchmark case with γ = 0.5 is in line with the evidence. The empirical studies
by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Luttmer (2005), and Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008)
estimated a Cobb-Douglas utility function (a special case of the CES function),
H(ck, c, x) = (ck)αc−γxβ (25)
Blanchflower and Oswald obtained estimates for −H2/H1 of about 0.4 while Luttmer and
Fafchamps and Shilpi found values of about 0.75 or higher. The experimental approach in
Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) gave estimates of about 0.35.
Our analysis of positional goods, it could be argued, does not necessarily invalidate
a representative-agent approach. In fact, our model has been cast in terms of identical
agents. But a representative-agent analysis easily goes wrong. Thus, assume for the sake of
the argument that the model in this section gives an accurate picture of the economy. In
equilibrium ck = c and the welfare of the representative-agent can be written as a reduced-
form function of conventional and environmental consumption,
W = w(c0, x0) +
1
1 + ρ
w(c1, x1) (26)
Using the descriptive approach and the general specification (26), it is required that the
properties of W match the observed behavior, that is, it is assumed that observed consump-
tion patterns can be derived from maximizing W subject to the relevant constraints. This
assumption is invalid. The patterns of actual consumption in the business-as-usual regime
are the same no matter how strong is the consumption externality (the value of γ in the
special case above), and this observational equivalence implies that the correct parameters
in the welfare function cannot - as a matter of principle - be decided on the basis of the
macroeconomic evidence. In this sense the ‘descriptive approach’ is intrinsically flawed.
Moreover, if (26) is fitted to the macroeconomic evidence, the positional externalities fail
12Strictly speaking, these expressions give the returns in terms of generalized consumption to the invest-
ment of one unit of the standard good. The return to the investment of one uit of the generalized good can
be obtained by adjusting the expressions using the common factor (∂z0/∂c)−1.
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to be incorporated and the welfare conclusions will be systematically biased. Putting it
differently, in equilibrium the correct representation of the social welfare may take the form
(26) whether or not there are consumption externalities. But the calibration of (26) to the
evidence is only legitimate in the absence of consumption externalities.
4 A survey
Climate change influences the production of some market goods - agricultural output is the
obvious example - but many of its effects concern non-market ’goods’ like climate related
diseases. In order to incorporate environmental externalities into existing economic models,
monetary values have to be determined for the non-market effects. These values are assigned
by estimating either individuals’ willingness to pay for the environmental goods or their
willingness to accept compensation for damages.
The estimates are based on either stated preference or revealed preference techniques.
Revealed preference techniques use market information associated with the effect being
evaluated to infer a monetary value - i.e. “surrogate markets” are used to value non-market
environmental goods (IPCC Working Group III, 1996, p. 184). Hedonic wage studies, for
example, use market information on wage differentials to derive estimates for the value of a
statistical life. These market-based revealed preference techniques are limited in scope as it
is often difficult to find relevant market information with which to infer a monetary value for
the non-market good or service in question. As such, costs and benefits are often estimated
using the contingent valuation method, whereby monetary values are assigned according to
individuals’ stated willingness to pay or willingness to accept compensation. Thus, the values
depend on what individuals’ behavior would have been if markets for the environmental
goods and services had existed - through what the IPCC terms “hypothetical markets”
(p. 184). Hypothetical markets reflect individuals’ responses to questions regarding their
personal willingness to pay, and“monetary estimates are thus able to cover both market and
nonmarket impacts” (p. 183).
The procedure requires a delineation of the target population, i.e. those individuals
must be identified that are affected by the environmental effect. Willingness to pay is esti-
mated using surveys that directly ask respondents how much they are willing to pay, and
these individual responses are aggregated to determine total willingness to pay, from which
monetary values are inferred. The resulting evaluations can be questioned (see for example
Venkatachalam, 2004; Ackerman and Heinzerling 2004). Willingness to pay fundamentally
reflects ability to pay, and the preferences and values of the rich are thus inherently over-
represented relative to those of the poor. At a more technical level, contingent valuation
surveys suffer from potential biases arising from incentives to misrepresent preferences or
from implied cues within the survey design that prompt certain responses (Mitchell and
Carson, 1989).13
13The IPCC notes that, "although controversial, these approaches are well established in the literature"
(p. 184). Similarly, Nordhaus’s estimates of the impacts of climate change rely on a willingness to pay
approach (Nordhaus, 2000, p. 71). While Nordhaus writes that valuation techniques with "an objective
behavioral component, whether in market prices or individual actions" are generally preferable since "Val-
uation techniques that are largely subjective - such as contingent valuation - are difficult to validate", he
also notes that techniques like contingent valuation are "needed in some areas" (Nordhaus 2006, p. 151).
Impacts - which are calculated by sector - are estimated through an impact index that represents "the
fraction of annual output that subregion j would be willing to pay to avoid the consequences on sector i
of a temperature increase of T ◦C" (73). These impacts are then used to estimate the damage functions,
which indicate the percent loss in output at different levels of global temperature increase. Thus, while
9
The positional character of consumption and the importance of own past consumption
as another reference point can impart additional biases. A higher willingness can be ex-
pected, first, if it is clarified that everyone shares in the mitigation effort (the positional
effect).14Secondly, framing the question as a reduction in the growth rate of traditional con-
sumption may also raise willingness to pay in comparison to a question defined in terms of
a lower level of traditional consumption (the effect of own past consumption as a reference
point).
We carried out a simple survey to preliminarily investigate this hypothesis. The survey
considers a particular environmental change. The subjects are informed that global warming
and other environmental changes threaten the survival of some animal species and that,
according to some estimates, as many as 25 percent of all species will be extinct before 2100
under current trends. Policy intervention, it is added, may change the scenario and ensure
the survival of these endangered species.
The purpose of the survey is not to value environmental goods or damages, but to
investigate the role of positional effects in individuals’ willingness to pay. As such, what
is important is not the exact loss that respondents are willing to accept to protect the
environment, but any systematic differences between willingness to pay when costs are
individual and when costs are shared. The extinction of species was chosen as a simple and
concrete example of a pure public good threatened by global warming.15
The presentation of the environmental problem — the extinction of the species — was
followed by a willingness-to-pay question. We used three different versions of the question.
In a first version, respondents were asked how large a proportion of their stream of current
and future income they would be willing to give up in order to ensure that no existing
species become extinct. A second version asked how large a proportion of current and
future incomes should be given up to ensure that no existing species become extinct, now
supposing that the costs of intervention are shared such that all incomes are reduced by the
same percentage. These two questions highlight the difference between a single individual’s
willingness to pay for environmental protection, and the willingness to pay for environmental
protection when there is no relative loss in income.
A third version of the question defined the issue in terms of reductions in the future
growth rate of income, rather than in terms of reductions in income levels. Again the losses
are to be shared - everyone will experience the same reduction in future income growth. The
question is constructed such that the intervals describing reductions in the future growth
rate of income roughly correspond to the intervals describing reductions in the level of the
current and future income stream. Exact correspondence between levels and growth rates
depends on the discount rate and the growth rate — specifically the difference between
the two — and the time horizon. Table 1 in the appendix shows the growth reductions
consistent with various parameters.16
many impacts are measured using surrogate markets, hypothetical markets and contingent valuation remain
a commonly used method by which to evaluate and incorporate non-market costs of climate change into
analysis.
14Evidence based on actual behavior - e.g. wage premia for risky jobs as an indicator of the value of life
- also suffers from this bias. It reflects individual behavior which (by definition) does not internalize the
externalities associated with positional goods.
15While some respondents commented that they did not have a high willingness to pay because some
threatened species are likely to be entirely irrelevant to their own future wellbeing, use of a more dramatic
example (that may enter more directly into respondents’ utility functions) is likely to detract from and
complicate the interpretation of the results. We wanted a climate effect that is well-defined and that has a
clear public-good character.
16The upper limits in the growth formulation are somewhat higher than in the level formulation for most
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Figure 1: Responses to question 1
The survey was carried out in March 2011. It was answered by a total of 496 students,
142 of which received question 1, 192 of which received question 2, and 162 of which re-
ceived question 3. The participants were UMass students in large introductory classes on
microeconomics and macroeconomics; teaching assistants administered the survey, and each
discussion section was randomly assigned one of the questions (all students in a section
received the same question). The questions are reproduced in the appendix.
The first issue is whether individuals are more willing to give up income in order to
protect the environment if the costs are shared and their relative position is maintained (the
positional effect). As expected, the survey indicates that sharing increases the willingness
to pay. When the loss is individual, approximately 54 percent of respondents said that they
would be willing to give up zero to five percent of their current and future stream of income
in order to prevent the extinction, while 25 percent of respondents would be willing to give
up five to ten percent of their current and future income stream (see Figure 1). When the
payment is to be shared, on the other hand, the percentage of respondents who were willing
to give up five to ten percent of current and future incomes increases to 41 percent (see
Figure 2). Thus, the standard estimates of willingness to pay for environmental goods used
in climate change analysis may be skewed downwards.
The results may support the existence of positional externalities in consumption. The
outcome may also, however, be interpreted to indicate other effects including, importantly,
concerns for fairness.17 The distinction between positionality and fairness concerns will be
important for some purposes, but the implications for the valuation of environmental goods
is similar: there will be a higher willingness to pay when costs are shared.
The first two versions of the question are framed in terms of levels, and it is possible that
respondents interpreted the questions to require an absolute decline relative to their current
reasonable parameters. This choice was deliberate. Since we expect higher willingness to pay in the case of
growth reductions, responses to the third question that are concentrated in the upper intervals are consistent
with an even greater willingness to pay for environmental protection in the context of growth rather than
level reductions - i.e. the bias incorporated in the intervals would further support the hypothesis.
17These results may also indicate other effects including, for example, a ’small number effect’ if respondents
feel that a 0-0.1 percentage points decline in income growth is small relative to the equivalent loss in income
levels.
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Figure 2: Responses to question 2
income and/or as a “loss”of income that has already been earned. Consumption is valued not
just relative to other people’s consumption, but also in relation to own past consumption.
Loss aversion is well documented in the behavioral economics literature — people tend to
place more value on avoiding losses than on acquiring gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991)
— and if the cost of environmental protection is understood to require a level reduction
in take-home pay, concerns regarding ability to meet other financial commitments such as
mortgage payments or car payments may decrease willingness to pay. On the other hand, if
the question is defined in terms of a lower future growth rate of income — implying lower
future income gains instead of a future income loss — loss aversion may not be expected
to play a significant role. Thus, one might expect people to be more willing to pay for
environmental protection if the cost is framed not as a loss in the level of income but as a
smaller future increment in income.
Figure 3 shows the responses to the third version of the question. Only 18 percent of
respondents said that 0 to 0.1 percentage points of income growth should be given up to
ensure the survival of species endangered by climate change (corresponding to a 0 to 5
percent reduction in future levels of income) - a rate considerably lower than with either of
the two previous questions. In contrast, 31 percent of respondents would be willing to accept
a 0.1 to 0.3 percentage point reduction in future income growth (corresponding to a 5 to 10
percent reduction in future levels of income), and 25 percent of respondents would be willing
to accept a 0.3 to 1 percentage point reduction in future income growth (corresponding to
a 10 to 20 percent reduction in future levels of income). In the second question (in which
the costs are to be shared and the question is asked in terms of levels), while 41 percent of
respondents thought we should give up 5 to 10 percent of future income growth to prevent
the extinction, only 7 percent of respondents were willing to give up 10 to 20 percent of
future income. Finally, while approximately 2 percent of respondents were willing to give up
more than 20 percent of future incomes to prevent the environmental damage, 15 percent of
respondents were willing to make the corresponding payment when the question is defined
in terms of growth rates.
As the objective of the survey is not to determine a monetary value for the species that
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Figure 3: Responses to question 3
potentially face extinction as a consequence of climate change, the exact intervals in the
questions are unimportant. The important point is that the results indicate a significantly
higher willingness to pay for environmental protection when the costs are to be shared
equally among the population and thus entail no relative loss in income and, furthermore,
that this higher willingness to pay is even more substantial when the costs take the form of
slower future growth rather than a level reduction in current and future incomes. The mean
and median responses to question 3 are more than double those to question 1.18
5 Conclusion
It is sometimes suggested that the science behind climate change may be weak but that
the economics in the integrated assessment models is well-established and sound. We are
not in position to evaluate the science but well-established as it may be, the economics
is questionable. Weitzman (2009) has emphasized the treatment of catastrophic risk, and
Rezai et al. (2011) and Ackerman et al. (2010) find that changes in some of the specifications
give results that are dramatically different from those of Tol and Nordhaus.
This paper has raised a different concern. Consumption externalities associated with po-
sitional goods and status concerns are well-documented. Using a simple two period model
we have shown that the interaction between these consumption externalities and environ-
mental externalities has implications for the appropriate discount rate: the required return
on investment in mitigation is lower than the private return to conventional investment. The
magnitude of the difference depends on the weight of positional consumption in utility. An
empirical literature has examined this question, and using estimates from this literature, the
effect on the appropriate discount rate is quantitatively highly significant. This conclusion
finds support in our survey of willingness to pay. Subjects show a much greater willingness
to pay when the costs are shared and when the costs are expressed in terms of lower future
18Assuming a uniform distribution within each interval and setting ρ − g = 3%, the means are 4.46, 5.7
and 10.8, respectively, for questions 1, 2 and 3.
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growth, rather than reductions in the level of income. Overall, the results suggest that in-
corporation of consumption externalities into climate change analysis may have important
implications for the calculation of the social costs and benefits of mitigation. By ignoring
consumption externalities, the existing integrated assessment models produce an inflated
estimate of the optimal level of greenhouse gas emissions today.
The argument has been cast within a standard optimal-growth framework. It is not
obvious, however, that this framework should dominate the discussion. The appropriateness
of a utilitarian approach in general and the specific version used by the integrated assessment
models can be challenged.19 The issues are beyond the scope of this paper, and we do
not pretend to have answers. It can be a problem, however, if an influential discipline
makes strong recommendations based on a questionable but seemingly ‘objective’ set of
ethical principles. The problem is compounded if the recommendations are couched in a
mathematical formalism that makes it hard for outsiders to follow the analysis.
19Economists are aware that there are alternative ethical principles. Nordhaus (2006a, p.8) for instance,
points out that “it should be clear that alternative ethical perspectives are possible. Moreover, as I suggest
below, alternative perspectives provide vastly different prescriptions about desirable climate change poli-
cies.” The actual analysis and recommendations, however, are almost invariably based on welfare functions
associated with representative-agent models. Sen (1982) is an exception. He suggests that future generations
have a right to a non-degraded environment and rejects the ‘welfarism’ of the standard analysis.
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Appendix: Survey Questions and Results
Question 1: Global warming and other environmental changes threaten the survival of
some animal species. According to some studies as many as 25 percent of all species may
become extinct before 2100 under current trends. Policy intervention may change this
scenario and ensure the survival of the endangered species.
How large a proportion of your stream of current and future income would you be willing
to give up in order to ensure that no existing species become extinct?
_____ 0 - 5%
_____ 5 -10%
_____10-20%
_____more than 20%
Question 2: Global warming and other environmental changes threaten the survival of
some animal species. According to some studies as many as 25 percent of all species may
become extinct before 2100 under current trends. Policy intervention may change this
scenario and ensure the survival of the endangered species.
Suppose that the costs of the intervention are shared and that all incomes are reduced
by the same percentage. In your view, how large a proportion of current and future incomes
should we be willing to give up in order to ensure that no existing species become extinct?
_____ 0 - 5%
_____ 5 - 10%
_____10 -20%
_____more than 20%
Question 3: Global warming and other environmental changes threaten the survival of
some animal species. According to some studies as many as 25 percent of all species may
become extinct before 2100 under current trends. Policy intervention may change this
scenario and ensure the survival of the endangered species.
Suppose that the intervention is financed by reducing the growth rate of the average
income and that this reduction is the same for everyone. As an example, if the intervention
requires reducing the growth rate of average income from 2% a year to 1.5%, then everyone
will experience income growth that is 0.5 percentage point lower than without intervention.
In your view, how large a reduction of the growth rate of future incomes should we be willing
to accept to ensure that no existing species become extinct?
_____0 percentage points
_____0 - 0.1 percentage points
_____0.1 - 0.3 percentage points
_____0.3 - 1 percentage points
_____more than 1 percentage point
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Table 1: Survey Results
0% 0-5% 5-10% 10-20% More than 20%
0
percentage
points
0-0.1
percentage
points
0.1-0.3
percentage
points
0.3-1
percentage
points
More than 1
percentage
point
Question 1 13.4% 54.2% 24.6% 7.0% 0.7%
Question 2 8.9% 41.7% 40.6% 6.8% 2.1%
Question 3 11.7% 17.8% 30.7% 24.5% 14.7%
Table 2: Growth reductions conssitent with intervals of level reductions for
various g and ρ; (T =∞)
Level Reductions g − ρ = −1% g−ρ = −2% g−ρ = −3% g−ρ = −4%
0% 0% growth
reduction
0% growth
reduction
0% growth
reduction
0% growth
reduction
0%-5% 0-0.05% growth
reduction
0-0.11%
growth
reduction
0-0.16%
growth
reduction
0-0.21%
growth
reduction
5%-10% 0.05-0.11%
growth
reduction
0.11-0.22%
growth
reduction
0.16-0.33%
growth
reduction
0-0.44%
growth
reduction
10%-20% 0.11-0.25%
growth
reduction
0.22-0.5%
growth
reduction
0.33-0.75%
growth
reduction
0.44-1%
growth
reduction
More than 20% more than
0.25% growth
reduction
more than
0.5% growth
reduction
more than
0.75% growth
reduction
more than 1%
growth
reduction
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